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Executive Summary 
 
Segregation in schools and neighborhoods are closely related. Segregated neighborhoods, of 
course, generate segregated neighborhood schools, but there is also feedback from school 
characteristics to neighborhoods. Potential residents, especially families with children, evaluate 
local schools when deciding where to live. This means that racial or social transition in 
schools—and the record shows that schools can change character very rapidly—can accelerate 
neighborhood transition. By the same token, stably integrated schools can stabilize 
neighborhoods. Integrated neighborhoods are much more stable in metropolitan areas with large-
scale school integration programs. Housing and school policy must be coordinated. 
 
At the same time, purely local approaches to integrate schools and neighborhoods have very 
limited potential in a region like the Twin Cities with more than 200 municipalities and school 
districts. When just a few cities and school districts are home to the overwhelming majority of 
residents and students of color, a truly effective integration strategy must be regional in scope. 
 
This policy brief summarizes the ills associated with these patterns, shows the existing pattern of 
segregation in the Twin Cities, and describes how a coordinated regional approach to integration 
using already existing programs could greatly reduce these ills. 
 
Why Segregation Matters 
 
Racial segregation is not just about race. It is also about access to jobs, good schools, and decent 
economic prospects in life. Where one lives significantly determines the availability and quality 
of opportunities such as public education, employment, and wealth accumulation and thus 
dramatically impacts one’s life chances. To the extent that racial segregation limits people’s 
residential choices, it undermines equality of opportunity. 
 
Racial segregation in neighborhoods is particularly harmful because it creates segregation in 
schools, adding another layer of costs for young people, undermining the region’s future. There 
are a number of reasons to be greatly concerned about segregation in the region’s schools and to 
pursue coordinated policies to increase integration in our schools. 
 
Integrated schools help students of all races: 
• Attending racially integrated schools and classrooms improves the academic achievement 
of minority students, whether measured by test scores, attendance rates, graduation rates, 
or the likelihood of attending college. 
• Research also shows that integration helps to reduce the achievement gap between 
students of different racial and ethnic groups.  
• Minority students who attended integrated schools tend to choose more lucrative 
occupations in which minorities are historically underrepresented and to have higher 
incomes than their peers in segregated schools.  
• Students who experience interracial contact in integrated school settings are more likely 
to live, work, and attend college in more integrated settings. 
• Interracial contact in desegregated settings decreases racial prejudice among students and 
facilitates more positive interracial relations. 
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• Integrated schools enhance the cultural competence of white students, preparing them for 
a more diverse workplace and society. 
 
 
Integrated schools help communities. When implemented on a metro-wide scale: 
• School integration can promote residential integration and enhance neighborhood 
stability, preventing integrated neighborhoods from resegregating. 
• Integration efforts can help communities avoid the disinvestment, declining housing 
values and job losses often associated with economic and racial segregation. 
• Revitalization of currently segregated inner city and inner suburb neighborhoods help the 
entire regional economy. 
 
Segregation in the Twin Cities  
 
Segregation in schools and neighborhoods is increasing for most students and residents of color 
in the Twin Cities, even as it is declining for whites. Increasing segregation in schools is 
particularly important because non-white segregated schools are also largely high-poverty 
schools. In 2008, 23 percent of Twin Cities elementary schools (or 108 schools) were non-white 
segregated. 96 percent of these schools had free and reduced-price lunch eligibility rates greater 
than 40 percent and 73 percent had rates greater than 75 percent. 
 
The number of non-white segregated schools is increasing rapidly in the Twin Cities metro area. 
In 1992, there were only nine, serving only one and a half percent of the region’s elementary 
students. By 2008, there were 108 non-white segregated schools, representing 22 percent of the 
region’s elementary students.  Between 1992 and 2008, the percentage of white students in 
segregated schools fell from 87 to 60 percent. But, at the same time, the percentages of black and 
Hispanic students attending non-white segregated schools shot up from 14 to 51 percent for 
black students and from 3 percent to 43 percent for Hispanics. 
Chart 2
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  Source: Minnesota Department of Education. 
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Being isolated in non-white segregated schools hurts students of color because these schools 
typically have high concentrations of poverty. In 2008, the average poverty rate in the non-white 
segregated schools in the Twin Cities metro was more than seven times the rate in predominantly 
white schools and three times the rate in integrated schools. (Chart 3) 
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  Source: Minnesota Department of Education. 
 
As a result of these trends, elementary students of color in the Twin Cities metro are more than 
five times as likely to attend schools with high concentrations of poverty (schools with free or 
reduced-price eligibility greater than 40 percent) as white students—56 percent compared to 10 
percent. The comparison is even starker for very high poverty schools (elementary schools with 
free or reduced-price eligibility greater than 75 percent). Students of color are more than thirty 
times as likely as white students to find themselves in very high poverty schools—29 percent 
compared to less than 1 percent.  
 
Policies to Reduce Segregation: Integration Revenue 
 
Integration Revenue is extra funding meant to promote integration that is provided to Minnesota 
school districts with racially isolated schools. But the program currently provides little or no 
incentive for school districts to desegregate their minority and low-income students. The purpose 
of the funding should be changed from “increasing interracial contact” to promoting the actual 
integration of school districts, schools, and classrooms. 
 
One way to do this is to modify the program’s funding formula for school districts in the Twin 
Cities to create positive incentives for districts to integrate schools by rewarding districts on a 
per student basis for documented pro-integrative student movements and for the number of 
students currently attending integrated schools. 
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The incentives should be designed to encourage pro-integrative strategies like magnet schools 
and targeted open enrollment programs within individual school districts and between two or 
more school districts. Individual districts need incentives because they face numerous 
disincentives to integrating schools that often lead to segregated schools even in districts which 
value the academic and civic benefits of integrated schools. Multi-district programs need 
incentives because both sending and receiving districts incur costs when participating in such 
programs. An existing program—the Choice is Yours Program—illustrates that modest financial 
incentives are enough to bring potential receiving districts into the programs. It also 
demonstrates how sending districts—Minneapolis in this case—can be hurt if they do not also 
receive incentives. 
 
A competitive grants strategy could also be used to improve the current funding mechanism. 
Districts could be required to submit proposals for specific integrative programs. This approach 
would be particularly well suited to Greater Minnesota because many school districts outside the 
metropolitan area do not have enough schools to use the attendance-boundary, magnet or open 
enrollment strategies encouraged by an incentive-based formula and distances are often too great 
to accommodate inter-district strategies. 
 
Policies to Reduce Segregation: Integration Districts 
 
The Twin Cites currently has three large-scale multi-district collaboratives—the West Metro 
Education Partnership (WMEP), the East Metro Education District (EMID), and the North West 
Suburban Integration School District (NWSISD). By many measures, these districts have 
impressive programs. WMEP and EMID both run several integrated, high performing schools 
which are available to students across their member districts. NWSISD runs a program that 
provides students transportation to magnet programs across its district. All three districts run 
programs geared to promoting integration in classrooms and educating teachers. 
  
These kinds of programs are particularly important because inter-district segregation—
differences between districts—is responsible for the bulk of segregation in the Twin Cities 
metropolitan area. However, inter-district programs are currently relatively limited in scope. 
There are currently over 100 non-white segregated schools in the Twin Cities with more than 
40,000 students. By comparison, the two magnet schools administered by WMEP only enroll 
about 1,000 students.  
 
If integration districts are to actually serve a significant role in integrating schools within their 
boundaries—both within and between their member districts—the consortiums’ powers and 
programs will have to be expanded by the state legislature. 
 
Segregation is a region-wide issue. However, most would agree that a seven-county integration 
district would be too large—covering too much territory for unified planning and too large to be 
administratively efficient. For these reasons, a single district organized into administrative 
regions or, possibly, multiple integration districts which, combined, encompassed all or most of 
the seven-county area make the most sense. The districts would have to be large enough to 
provide full potential to integrate the region’s schools but small enough to allow for reasonable 
transportation costs. 
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A region-wide integration district—or a system of four or five districts—would not have one 
“silver bullet” available to solve all problems. Instead, the district could engage in several 
activities, each with the potential to lessen segregation. These might include: 
• Metro Magnets: new magnets designed to both maximize integration and allow districts 
to offer students access to different curricula than they can offer within individual 
districts in an integrated setting.  
• Coordinating District-Run Magnet Schools. It will still often make sense for districts, 
especially large districts, to operate their own magnets aimed primarily at their own 
students. However, an uncoordinated system of magnets could also produce needless 
duplication. The integration district(s) would be the logical clearinghouse for approval of 
local proposals for new magnets. The regional district could also work with member 
districts to ensure that already-existing magnets fit into the regional system. 
• Metro Job Center Magnets: Another way to attract students from across the metro is to 
offer specialized magnet schools at large, high-density job centers, like Minneapolis’ 
central business district or parts of the I-494 corridor. Magnet schools at job centers have 
tremendous integrative potential and can be an attractive alternative for commuters. Since 
parents often commute across significant distances, it makes sense that these job center 
magnets be available to students on a metro-wide basis and be run by a metro integration 
district.  Job center magnets can also maintain integrated student bodies by enrolling 
students whose parents work in the job center while guaranteeing a certain number of 
seats to students who live in a designated attendance zone that is near the job center.  
• Oversight of Member District Integration: Oversight over school desegregation efforts is 
currently vested in the Minnesota Department of Education. Many school advocates have 
been critical of numerous aspects of the state desegregation rule, including the scope of 
the current rule and the efficacy of the department’s efforts. Vesting this power instead in 
integration districts could be a highly contentious issue to some districts. However, there 
could be advantages to member districts in granting some oversight of boundary-making 
decisions to a metro integration district. 
  
Policies to Reduce Segregation: Affordable Housing Programs 
 
The placement of affordable housing is a critical part of neighborhood segregation. 
Concentrating affordable housing in racially segregated or poor neighborhoods deepens 
segregation. By encouraging construction of affordable housing units in such neighborhoods, 
many government housing programs contribute to residential segregation. 
 
Affordable housing programs funded through the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Program 
(LIHTC) and the HUD Section 8 Program have a great deal of potential to contribute to efforts to 
reduce economic and racial segregation in Twin Cities neighborhoods. This means that they also 
have great potential to reduce school segregation. 
 
Both of these programs currently concentrate their efforts disproportionately in high-poverty 
neighborhoods. Simulations show that if, instead, the overall number of LIHTC and Section 8 
affordable housing units were distributed to all parts of the region in proportion with population 
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and if units were assigned randomly by race (or in a pro-integrative fashion), then segregation in 
the region’s schools could be greatly reduced. 
  
Conclusions 
 
The time is ripe for new approaches to integration in the Twin Cities. Past practices are largely 
failing. Students of color in Twin Cities schools are more and more likely to be isolated in non-
white segregated schools. These schools are overwhelmingly poor—more than nine out of ten 
non-white segregated elementary schools have poverty rates above 40 percent and more than 
seven out of ten show rates above 75 percent. 
 
The current situation in schools exacerbates the performance gap between white and non-white 
students. Growing school segregation also accelerates neighborhood segregation, which in turn 
feeds back to further increase segregation in schools. 
 
To break the vicious cycle, we must deal with school and neighborhood integration on a regional 
scale. The Twin Cities has been well served by a rich tradition of regional policy-making in other 
policy areas. It is time to extend these efforts to schools and housing. 
 
The infrastructure for reform is in place—the integration revenue program provides a pool of 
funds to support local efforts; existing integration districts provide the framework and experience 
for a larger, improved system; and existing federal housing programs are large enough to make a 
serious dent in the problem with only modest reforms. 
 
Finally, the last piece of the puzzle—the political will to act—may also be in place. Legislators 
on both sides of the aisle in the Minnesota House and Senate have expressed support for reform 
to refocus the Integration Revenue Program. And officials in each of the Integration Districts and 
affected Superintendents have suggested that the current system needs reform. Many of the 
primary actors thus agree that the time to act is now. 
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I.  Introduction  
 
Segregation in schools and neighborhoods are closely related. Segregated neighborhoods, of 
course, generate segregated neighborhood schools, but there is also feedback from school 
characteristics to neighborhoods. Potential residents, especially families with children, evaluate 
local schools when deciding where to live. This means that racial or social transition in 
schools—and the record shows that schools can change character very rapidly—can accelerate 
neighborhood transition. By the same token, stably integrated schools can stabilize 
neighborhoods. Integrated neighborhoods are much more stable in metropolitan areas with large-
scale school integration programs. 
 
This means that, to be successful, housing and school policy must be coordinated. Attempts to 
integrate schools while ignoring housing segregation or to integrate housing while ignoring 
school segregation are doomed to failure. 
 
At the same time, purely local approaches to integrate schools and neighborhoods have very 
limited potential in a region like the Twin Cities with more than 200 municipalities and school 
districts. When just a few cities and school districts are home to the overwhelming majority of 
residents and students of color, a truly effective integration strategy must be regional in scope. 
 
This policy brief shows the existing pattern of segregation in the Twin Cities, summarizes the ills 
associated with these patterns and describes how a coordinated regional approach to integration 
using already existing programs could greatly reduce these ills. 
 
The highlighted policy areas are integration revenue, integration districts and affordable housing 
programs. Each of these policy areas relates directly to reforms currently or recently under 
debate in the Minnesota legislature: 
• Integration revenue. This is a state program designed to finance more effective 
integration programs in Minnesota schools, but which virtually everyone agrees needs 
reform. An alternative incentive-based funding formula designed to reward school 
districts showing real, measurable pro-integrative outcomes in their schools and 
classrooms would better direct these resources to areas where they are most needed and 
toward policies that produce concrete outcomes. 
• Integration districts. There are currently three integration districts in the Twin Cities 
comprised of several school districts each. Each has come under fire in recent years, 
largely because they are not empowered to pursue comprehensive pro-integration efforts. 
A wider approach engaging a greater share of the region would have much greater 
potential to create and nurture stably integrated schools over the long term. 
• Affordable housing. The Twin Cities is known as a region which uses its federal 
affordable housing funding—Low-income Housing Tax Credits (LIHTC) and HUD 
Section 8 projects and vouchers—progressively to promote more affordable housing in 
suburban areas with strong economies and schools. However, even though the region 
compares relatively well with other parts of the country, the distribution of housing under 
these programs is still skewed toward central, low-income, segregated neighborhoods. 
The numbers show that even relatively modest changes in the distribution of units funded 
under these programs could have profound effects on schools and neighborhoods. 
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II. Segregation in the Twin Cities  
 
Following the release of the 2000 Census, scholars from all disciplines were eager to celebrate 
the decline of racial segregation in the nation. Study after study documented the decline in broad 
measures of racial segregation in many metropolitan areas during the 1990s. In the Twin Cities, 
for instance, the most commonly used general measure of neighborhood segregation, the 
dissimilarity index, fell from 62 in 1990 to 58 in 2000, suggesting that, in some sense, 
segregation had declined by six or seven percent. 
 
There are two problems with this very general assessment. First, broad measures like the 
dissimilarity index fail to capture the increasing complexity of race in America. And second, 
even very broad measures show that segregation is increasing in schools. A closer look at racial 
segregation in metropolitan areas reveals disturbing trends. In today’s more racially diverse 
society, a new type of segregation is emerging for communities of color. This new type involves 
segregation of non-whites from whites rather than of individual races from whites. 
 
As racial diversity expands in the metropolitan area, different communities of color are mixing 
with each other in non-white segregated schools and neighborhoods but not with whites. While 
fewer whites are in predominantly white schools and neighborhoods, more people of color find 
themselves in non-white segregated schools and neighborhoods. As a result, segregation is 
increasing for most students and residents of color, even as it is declining for whites.   
 
Segregation Trends 
 
School segregation is a serious and increasing problem in the Twin Cities metropolitan area. 
Racial segregation in schools is important because experience shows us that it creates drastically 
different education experiences for children of color than for white children. Non-white 
segregated schools are also largely high-poverty schools. In 1992, less than two percent of 
elementary schools in the Twin Cities (or 9 schools) were non-white segregated. By 2008, this 
had increased to 23 percent (108 elementary schools).1 In 2008, 96 percent of these schools had 
high poverty rates (a share of free and reduced-price lunch eligible students greater than 40 
percent) and 73 percent had very high poverty rates (a share of free and reduced-price lunch 
eligible students greater than 75 percent). 
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 Source: Minnesota Department of Education 
 
 
At the same time, the number of integrated schools increased. By 2008, 37 percent of the 
region’s students were in integrated schools, up from 22 percent in 1992. However, this increase 
essentially reflected the fact that white students are now much less likely to attend all-white 
schools. Between 1992 and 2008, the percentage of white students in segregated schools fell 
from 87 to 60 percent. (Chart 2) But, at the same time, the percentages of black and Hispanic 
students attending non-white segregated schools shot up from 14 to 51 percent for black students 
and from 3 percent to 43 percent for Hispanics. 
 
Overall, the data show that a new type of segregation is emerging in schools. Students of color 
are increasingly attending segregated schools with other students of color and not with whites. 
As white students experience further integration, more and more students of color attend 
segregated schools. 
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  Source: Minnesota Department of Education. 
 
 
Being isolated in non-white segregated schools hurts students of color because these schools 
typically have high concentrations of poverty. In 2008, the average poverty rate in the non-white 
segregated schools in the Twin Cities metro was more than seven times the rate in predominantly 
white schools and three times the rate in integrated schools. (Chart 3) 
 
 
  Source: Minnesota Department of Education. 
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As a result of these trends, students of color in the Twin Cities metro are more than five times as 
likely to attend schools with high concentrations of poverty (free/reduced price eligibility > 40 
percent) as white students—56 percent compared to 10 percent. (Chart 4) The comparison is 
even starker for very high poverty schools (free/reduced price eligibility > 75 percent). Students 
of color are more than thirty times as likely as white students to find themselves in very high 
poverty schools—29 percent compared to less than 1 percent. (Chart 5) 
 
 
Source: Minnesota Department of Education. 
 
 
Source: Minnesota Department of Education. 
Chart 4
Percentage of Students Attending Schools with High Poverty 
Rates (Free or Reduced Price Lunch Rates > 40%), 2008
Twin Cities Metropolitan Area
62
54 49 51
10
56
0
20
40
60
80
100
Black Hispanic Asian Native
American
White Total Non-
White
Chart 5
Percentage of Students Attending Schools with Very High Poverty 
Rates (Free/Reduced Price Lunch Rates > 75%), 2008
Twin Cities Metropolitan Area
32
25 28 28
1
29
0
20
40
60
80
100
Black Hispanic Asian Native
American
White Total Non-
White
 6 
The Geography of Segregation 
 
The effects of segregation are felt much more dramatically in some parts of the region than in 
others. Segregated schools are not randomly scattered across the metropolitan area. (Map 1) 
Non-white segregated schools are highly concentrated in just a few areas—in the two central 
cities and a few suburbs south and northwest of Minneapolis for the most part. 
 
Map 1 
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The current pattern reflects dramatic changes during the late 1990s and early 2000s. During this 
time non-white shares increased dramatically in parts of the suburbs, especially in inner suburban 
school districts. (Map 2) Racial change was extraordinarily rapid in many cases. Non-white 
student shares increased by more than 60 percentage points in just over 10 years—from the 20s 
to the 90s—in some suburban elementary schools. (The following map will be replaced next 
week with a map showing changes from 1995 to 2008.) 
 
Map 2 
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Racial segregation does not only isolate non-white students by race, it also isolates them in high-
poverty schools. Non-white segregated schools are almost invariably also high-poverty schools. 
(Map 3) 
  
Map 3 
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III. Why Does Racial Segregation Matter? 
 
Racial Segregation Undermines Equality of Opportunity 
 
Racial segregation is not just about race. It is also about access to jobs, good schools, and decent 
economic prospects in life. Where one lives significantly determines the availability and quality 
of opportunities such as public education, employment, and wealth accumulation and thus 
dramatically impacts one’s life chances. To the extent that racial segregation limits people’s 
residential choices, it undermines equality of opportunity. 
 
Access to opportunities varies significantly by race and income in most metropolitan areas.2 
Metropolitan housing markets sort people by both race/ethnicity and income. This process 
inevitably creates unequal access to opportunity. Past research by IRP shows that communities in 
the region fall into several distinct categories based on characteristics directly related to 
opportunities available to residents—population growth, job concentrations, poverty, and local 
government tax capacities and service costs.3 The results show that the Twin Cities region shows 
a great deal of diversity in community types, especially in the suburbs. Just under half of the 
region’s households live in the two central cities and “stressed suburbs”—places showing clear 
signs of fiscal stress and other indicators of low-than-average opportunities, 
 
However, the proportion of people of color living in the central cities and stressed suburbs is 
dramatically higher. Over three quarters of the region’s residents of color live in central cities 
and stressed suburbs—communities that offer very limited opportunities to their residents. In 
contrast, only two fifths of the region’s white residents live in these low-opportunity 
communities. 
 
On the other side, just over half of the region’s households live in communities with 
characteristics associated with moderate or high levels of opportunity. But only a quarter of the 
region’s residents of color live in these communities compared to almost three fifths of the 
region’s white residents. 
 
Racial segregation in neighborhoods is particularly harmful because it creates segregation in 
schools, adding another layer of costs for young people, undermining the region’s future. There 
are a number of reasons to be greatly concerned about segregation in the region’s schools and to 
pursue coordinated policies to increase integration in our schools. 
 
Integrated Schools Help Students  
 
Integrated schools boost academic achievement, attainment, and expectations; improve 
opportunities for students of color, and generate valuable social benefits. Integrated schools also 
enhance the cultural competence of white students and prepare them for a more diverse 
workplace and society. 
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Attending racially integrated schools and classrooms improves the academic achievement of 
minority students measured by test scores.4 Minority students graduating from desegregated 
schools tend to complete more years of education, have higher college attendance rates, and tend 
to choose more lucrative occupations in which minorities are historically underrepresented.5 
Minority students who attended integrated schools have higher incomes than their peers in 
segregated schools.6 Both white and non-white students tend to have higher educational 
aspirations if they have cross-race friendships.7 
 
Students who experience interracial contact in integrated school settings are more likely to live, 
work, and attend college in more integrated settings.8 Integrated classrooms improve the stability 
of interracial friendships and increase the likelihood of interracial friendships as adults.9 
Interracial contact in desegregated settings decreases racial prejudice among students and 
facilitates more positive interracial relations.10 Students who attend integrated schools report an 
increased sense of civic engagement compared to their segregated peers.11 
 
Integrated schools make sense not only from a moral point of view but also from an economic 
point of view. Giving all children a fair start with the choice to attend opportunity-rich middle-
class schools helps create the skilled workforce metropolitan regions need to replace impending 
baby-boom retirements. During a period of skilled labor shortages nationwide, today’s students 
are the next generation of workers who will replace these retirees. 12  
 
While the retirees of the Twin Cities region will be 90 percent white, the region’s next 
generation of workers will be 75 percent white.13 Segregated schools and a wide gap between 
white and non-white graduation rates will not yield the skilled workers needed for the region’s 
economy.14 Even if not morally moved by fairness to offer genuine educational opportunity to all 
children, the region cannot ignore the costs of failing to educate all of its children. 
 
Integrated Schools Help Communities  
 
If school integration involves all of a region’s socio-economic groups, its benefits can extend 
from students to neighborhoods. When implemented on a metro-wide scale, school integration 
can promote residential integration and enhance neighborhood stability.15 If parents know that 
their children will attend an effective, integrated school regardless of where they live, they will 
be less likely to flee racially mixed or changing neighborhoods. This improves the odds that 
integrated neighborhoods will remain integrated, making it easier to prevent resegregation, 
neighborhood decline, and the costs associated with segregation. 
 
Between 1970 and 1990, regions with metro-wide school desegregation plans had residential 
segregation decreases twice the national average.16 Research reported below also demonstrates 
that large-scale school desegregation enhances neighborhood stability. The findings reveal that 
integrated neighborhoods become more likely to resegregate than to remain integrated once their 
share of non-white residents reaches a relatively modest level. In contrast, in metropolitan areas 
with large scale school desegregation plans, integrated neighborhoods are more likely to stay 
integrated than to resegregate regardless of their initial racial composition.17 
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Metro-wide plans prevent two problems that can make small-area plans counter-productive. 
First, metro-wide plans reach beyond areas of residential segregation to include enough schools 
and students to ensure that all schools can be effective middle-class schools. Second, they 
prevent the destructive consequence of concentrating desegregation efforts in only a few less-
affluent white neighborhoods that often already are struggling to maintain racial balance and 
stable integration. By asking every school to educate a small share of low-income children, a 
region prevents further concentration of poor children and eliminates the need for families to flee 
untenable poverty enrollments.   
 
In contrast, desegregation plans affecting only a small portion of a metro region, usually a central 
city, trigger greater residential segregation and worsen school segregation. This is the case 
because a single-district desegregation effort typically isolates schools where the majority of 
students are low-income and non-white and encourages flight to near-by districts.18 
Desegregation plans covering small geographic areas enable racially identifiable schools to 
persist.19 When school desegregation plans do not cover a sufficiently large scale, real estate 
practices and preferences remain school-identified and race-based. 20 
 
Integration is Necessary for Regional Vitality 
 
Racial and economic segregation destabilize communities and undermine their economic vitality 
by triggering a process of disinvestment in these communities. This process of disinvestment 
reduces housing values and drives out the businesses generating jobs and tax base. In addition, 
racial segregation and concentration of poverty impose a number of social costs on communities, 
inflating the expenditure side of their fiscal ledgers. Communities are put in a double bind, as 
racial segregation and concentration of poverty sap their fiscal capacities while their financial 
obligations accelerate as a result of growing social costs. As a result, they become less 
competitive in the market place. 
 
Racial and economic segregation impacts various types of communities in the region. Many 
neighborhoods in the central cities have already been hard hit by the disinvestment caused by 
segregation. Once a problem confined to central cities, racial and economic segregation is now a 
regional concern, threatening the vitality of different types of suburban communities. Schools, 
which are powerful indicators of a community’s health, are already experiencing social and 
economic changes which signal growing segregation in stressed suburbs.  
 
However, stressed suburbs are not alone in experiencing these disturbing segregation patterns. 
Such patterns are emerging even in some higher-income, suburban job centers that are in close 
proximity to the stressed suburbs of the region. These suburban communities face the risk of 
decline unless they can preempt spreading racial and economic segregation before it undermines 
the vitality of their communities. 
 
A metropolitan area jeopardizes its competitive edge and long-term quality of life by permitting 
segregation to damage educational opportunity and neighborhood stability in its central cities and 
adjacent suburbs. The success of a region’s central cities and suburbs tends to move together.21 
Vibrant central cities can be engines of growth for metropolitan areas.22 Population growth and 
economic growth correlate for both cities and regions.23 In addition, economic growth in a large 
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central city can have positive spillover effects of one to two percent on its suburbs for every one 
percent increase in the central city.24 
 
 
IV. Policies to Reduce Segregation: Integration Revenue 
 
The Minnesota Legislature established the School District Integration Revenue Program in 1997 
to provide funding to school districts for integration-related activities. The program distributed 
roughly $85 million to 80 school districts statewide in 2007—about $75 million of the total went 
to districts in the Twin Cities metropolitan area. 
 
Schools and school district receive integration funds as part of the K-12 education formula and 
their eligibility is based on their “protected student”—i.e. non-white student—populations. 
School districts are eligible to receive integration funding if they fulfill one of four criteria: (1) if 
they have at least one “racially identifiable school;” (2) if they are a “racially isolated” district; 
(3) if they are adjacent to a racially isolated district; or (4) if they work with a racially isolated 
district on a voluntary basis even if they are not an adjoining district. 
 
The Duluth, St. Paul, and Minneapolis school districts receive a fixed amount of the integration 
revenue ($206, $445, and $445 times the adjusted pupil units for the school year 
respectively). These districts receive funding regardless of the sufficiency of the plans to 
use the integration revenue dollars. All other districts receive different per-student funding 
rates depending on their specific eligibility criteria. The total amount of integration revenue they 
receive depends on their total enrollment and the per-student funding rate for which they are 
eligible. 
 
Map 4 shows the distribution of funds to Twin Cities metropolitan area school districts under the 
program. Funding is focused on the central cities with the remaining funds cast widely across 
suburban districts, including some districts with relatively modest non-white student populations. 
 
Racially isolated districts are required to establish a multidistrict collaboration council with the 
adjoining districts to develop an “integration plan” to improve cross-district integration 
opportunities. School districts, other than Minneapolis, St. Paul, and Duluth, with racially 
isolated schools are required to draft a budget detailing how expenditures will be used 
specifically to support increased opportunities for interracial contact. 
 
The current program has a number of shortcomings. The most important limitation of the 
program is the ambiguity of its main goal. The program’s stated goal is to promote “interracial 
contacts.” School districts have taken this term to mean a wide range of integration-related 
activities ranging from one-day multicultural activities to inter-district magnet schools and cross-
district transportation. The goal of the program needs to be clarified to unambiguously and 
directly encourage physical integration of school districts, schools, and classrooms. 
 
Currently, the primary use of integration revenue in Minnesota appears to be to provide extra 
funding for poor and minority schools in the form of ESL teachers, support staff, and teacher 
training. While these are worthy purposes, integration revenue funding currently provides little 
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or no incentive for school districts to desegregate their minority and low-income students. As a 
result, in practice, the program ends up providing an extra source of funding to cash-strapped 
districts that maintain segregation. 
 
Map 4 
 
In addition, as noted by a report from the Office of the Legislative Auditor, the program has 
some unintended and potentially negative consequences. Among other problems, the formula 
contains a financial disincentive to fully eradicate segregation in schools because school districts 
would no longer receive integration revenue once schools are fully integrated. 
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Revisions to the program passed by the legislature in 2009 did little to rectify these issues. The 
primary changes were to add reduction of the racial achievement gap as a goal of the program 
and to tighten up the process by which the state department of education reviews local 
integration plans. 
 
A proposal to reform the integration revenue program 
 
Integration Revenue is extra funding that is meant to promote integration in Minnesota school 
districts with racially isolated schools.  In fact, the current program provides little or no incentive 
for school districts to desegregate their minority and low-income students. To meet its original 
goals, the purpose of the funding should be changed from “increasing interracial contact” to 
promoting the actual integration of school districts, schools, and classrooms. 
 
One very efficient way to do this is to use the funding formula to create incentives for districts to 
integrate schools by rewarding school districts on a per student basis for documented pro-
integrative student movements. This focuses school district efforts on outcomes and does not 
require complicated regulations about how districts should spend the money. If a district uses 
this year’s allocation as a windfall available to fund general operations, its pro-integration are 
likely to falter, leading to less-integrated schools in the future, leading to less funding. (This, of 
course, does not preclude state rules governing spending under the program, but the outcome 
orientation reduces the need for such regulations.) 
 
School districts face numerous disincentives to integrating schools, including parent resistance 
and transportation costs. These disincentives frequently lead to segregated schools, even in 
districts that understand the academic and citizenship values of integrated schools. It is important 
that incentives are structured so that schools are rewarded for integrative measures.  
 
The approach proposed here is provide separate incentives for intra-district efforts, inter-district 
programs, and the number of students in integrated schools. 
 
Intra-district integrative efforts would be rewarded by providing extra revenue for integrative 
student movements among schools within the district. Included would be moves by white 
students from predominantly white-assigned schools to integrated or predominantly non-white 
schools and moves by students of color from predominantly non-white-assigned schools to 
integrated or predominantly white schools. Districts might encourage such moves by a variety of 
methods, including opening integrated magnet schools, creating intra-district open-enrollment 
programs that allow students assigned to one neighborhood school to attend another school in the 
district, or by using special programs within schools—such as baccalaureate or language-
intensive coursework—to bring students from across the district to specific schools.  
 
The majority of school segregation in the Twin Cites is the result of segregation between school 
districts, rather than between schools within individual district. Until housing patterns become 
truly integrated on a regional scale, integrating schools will require that some students cross 
district boundaries. Integrative programs, such as the Choice is Yours program, have shown that, 
when incentives are attached to integrative moves, school districts are very willing to accept 
students. 
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However, sending districts—Minneapolis, in the case of the Choice is Yours—which participate 
in a inter-district programs now face a financial penalty when students move out of the district. 
(Although the associated enrollment decline also reduces costs, the cost reduction will almost 
inevitably be less than the loss of revenue, because of fixed costs, hiring-firing rules and other 
factors.) 
The proposed plan would avoid this problem by compensating both receiving and sending 
districts when pro-integrative inter-district moves occur. Both participating districts would get 
extra revenue when a white student from a predominantly white-assigned school moved to an 
integrated or predominantly non-white school in another district, or when a student of color from 
a predominantly non-white-assigned school moved to an integrated or predominantly white 
school in another district.  
 
Finally, school districts would be rewarded for creating pro-integrative attendance areas with a 
financial incentive providing extra money for students in schools meeting a predetermined 
definition of racially integrated schools. 
 
Simulating the outcomes of incentive-based reform 
 
Map 5 and Table 1 show the results in the Twin Cities metropolitan area of a program with a 
three-part incentive like that described above. The simulation provided school districts with: 
 
• $2,250 per pro-integrative intra-district move. For the purposes of the simulation, only 
students attending integrated magnets were counted as integrative moves. Data limitations 
prevented counting other types of pro-integrative moves across attendance boundaries. 
 
• $2,250 per pro-integrative inter-district move (provided to both the sending and 
receiving districts). This amount is commensurate with what is provided to most receiving 
districts by the Choice is Yours program, an incentive that has proven adequate to get suburban 
districts to participate in the program. For the purposes of the simulations, only students 
participating in the Choice is Yours program were counted. Data limitations prevented counting 
other types of pro-integrative moves across district boundaries. 
 
• $250 per student in integrated schools. Integrated schools were defined as schools with 
non-white enrollment shares between 25 and 75 percent. 
 
The results of the simulation show that changing the program in this way would focus the 
program more on the districts with the greatest potential to achieve results—central city and 
inner suburban districts with substantial non-white enrollments—without disrupting revenue 
streams to the districts which now rely most heavily on the program. 
 
Revenues would be spread more evenly across inner suburban districts with significant non-
white student populations. The exceptions are Brooklyn Center and Fridley which would receive 
large increases per student because of existing magnet programs. At the same time, Minneapolis 
and S. Paul would not suffer significant revenue declines because each district has significant 
numbers of students in integrated magnets and traditional schools.   
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Overall, the simulation shows that the integration revenue can be re-focused on what should be 
its central goal—increasing the number of students in integrated schools—without disrupting the 
finances of districts currently receiving funds or increasing total funding under the program.25 
 
Map 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 17 
 
 
 Source: Minnesota Department of Education and various local school districts.
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V. Policies to Reduce Segregation: Integration Districts 
 
The Twin Cites already has three large-scale multi-district collaboratives—the West Metro 
Education Partnership (WMEP), the East Metro Education District (EMID), and the North West 
Suburban Integration School District (NWSISD). By many measures, these districts have 
impressive programs. WMEP and EMID both run several integrated, high performing schools 
which are available to students across their member districts. NWSISD runs a program that 
provides students transportation to magnet programs across its district. All three districts run 
programs geared to promoting integration in classrooms and educating teachers. Map 6 shows 
the boundaries of the current integration districts. 
 
These integration collaborative districts, however, have not been entirely successful. The districts 
have not prevented the segregation and resegregation of schools in their member districts. 
Districts within all three collaboratives have made segregative boundary decisions and the 
integration districts currently do not have the power to greatly influence these kinds of decisions. 
This inability is a serious shortcoming.  
 
While intra-district decision-making is important, inter-district segregation—differences between 
districts—explain the bulk of segregation in the Twin Cities metropolitan area. The 
collaboratives’ inter-district desegregation plans are therefore potentially very important. 
However, these programs are relatively limited in scope. The scale of segregation in the Twin 
Cities is large—there are currently more than 100 non-white segregated schools in the region, for 
instance—and the three integration districts can only provide integrated education to a limited 
number of students. For example, the two magnet schools administered by WMEP only enroll 
about 1,000 students. Further, under-participation, often by the wealthiest and whitest districts, 
also undercuts the integrative potential of the districts.  
 
For integration districts to actually serve a significant role in integrating schools within their 
boundaries—both within and between member districts—the consortiums’ powers and programs 
will have to be expanded by the state legislature.  
 
While the three inter-district collaboratives have had some successes in increasing the amount of 
school integration across the metro, these districts cannot remedy segregation. School and 
residential segregation occur on the metro level, not the district level. Attempting to remedy 
school segregation in one sector of the metro-region without addressing it in others seems likely 
to create conditions for school resegregation in the rest of the metro. Further, even school 
districts within inter-district collaborations have been continually expanding magnet school 
programs, often at great expense, to keep students in their district or attract students from other 
districts. This competition for students is costly and can be counter-productive. 
 
Metro-wide school districts have successfully stabilized metropolitan regions. Very large school 
districts operate very successful integrated school systems in places like Wake County, North 
Carolina and Louisville, Kentucky. Large school districts allow for greater planning efficiencies 
and minimize the opportunity for white flight. This helps districts maintain stably integrated 
schools in the face of increasing regional diversity. Metro-wide school districts also make 
cooperative planning with local or regional land-use planning agencies much more feasible and 
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efficient. In the Twin Cities, the ability of the Metropolitan Council to control urban sprawl, 
implement fair-share, affordable housing initiatives and to protect the environment could be 
greatly enhanced if coordinating its activities with local education decisions—like where to build 
new schools—involved dealing with a single metro-wide agency instead of 50 or 60 individual 
school districts. 
 
Map 6 
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Why do we need a broader regional approach to school integration? 
 
Stably integrated schools are an essential component of any effort to truly integrate the places 
where we live and work. Many neighborhoods that are integrated at a given time are actually in 
transition. Segregated neighborhoods, in contrast, tend to remain segregated. The combination of 
these two trends limits the extent to which neighborhoods can remain stably integrated. 
However, stably integrated school systems can affect these trends dramatically. 
 
Long term data for the Twin Cities show these patterns very clearly. IRP’s research shows that 
56 percent of Twin Cities neighborhoods that were integrated in 1980 became segregated by 
2000. At the same time, 83 percent of the neighborhoods that were segregated in 1980 in the 
region were still segregated two decades later.26 
 
The resegregation of once-integrated neighborhoods shows a common pattern: as a 
neighborhood’s non-white population share increases, it becomes more and more likely to 
segregate. The higher the share of non-white residents in a neighborhood, the greater is the 
likelihood that the neighborhood will eventually become segregated.  
 
Figure 1 illustrates the relationship for neighborhoods in the 25 largest metropolitan areas that 
were black/white integrated in 1980. The figure includes three lines each corresponding to 
neighborhood transition status. The solid red line shows the percentage of white-black 
neighborhoods that remained integrated from 1980 and 2000. The blue line shows the percentage 
of white-black neighborhoods that became non-white segregated by 2000. Finally, the dotted line 
shows the white-black neighborhoods that became predominantly white by 2000. 
 
Figure 1 
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On the horizontal axis, the figure shows the black population shares in 1980, ranging from 10 
percent to 50 percent, percentages representing the lower and upper limits for a neighborhood to 
be classified as white/black integrated in the system used for the analysis. The solid red line 
crosses 50 percent at 30 percent black. This means that a white-black integrated neighborhood 
that was 30 percent or more black in 1980 was more likely to make the transition to one of the 
segregated categories than it was to remain integrated during the next 20 years.(The results are 
similar for other types of integrated neighborhoods.)27 
 
In contrast, creating the same chart for the 15 metropolitan areas that had large-scale regional 
integration programs (region-wide or county-wide in the primary county) in schools during this 
period shows how region-wide school integration policies can stabilize housing patterns.28 In 
these metropolitan areas, neighborhoods that were white-black integrated in 1980 were more 
likely to remain integrated during the next 20 years than to resegregate regardless of the initial 
racial mix. In other words, even neighborhoods that were very close to 50 percent black—the 
upper limit to be designated integrated in 1980—were more likely to remain integrated than to 
make the transition to segregated. Apparently, white households are less likely to flee racially 
mixed environments if they are confident that their children will continue to attend integrated 
schools even if the racial mix of the neighborhood changes. 
 
Figure 2 
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The neighborhood dynamics illustrated by Figure 1 put many of the school districts in the Twin 
Cities at risk. (Table 1) Sixteen school districts, mostly in inner and middle suburbs, had non-
white student shares in the 20 to 40 percent range where resegregation rates approach or exceed 
the percentage of schools that remain integrated in Figure 1. Another five suburban districts 
already had non-white shares above 40 percent. 
 
 
Table 1 
 
 
Source: Minnesota Department of Education. 
 
 
 
What would a regional integration district look like? 
 
Segregation is a region-wide issue. However, most would agree that a seven-county integration 
district would be too large—covering too much territory for unified planning and too large to be 
administratively efficient. For these reasons, a single district organized into administrative 
regions or, possibly, multiple integration districts which, combined, encompassed all or most of 
the seven-county area make the most sense. The districts would have to be large enough to 
provide full potential to integrate the region’s schools but small enough to allow for reasonable 
home to school trip lengths. 
 
Map 7 shows potential boundaries for a five “super-district” option. The map shows that creating 
districts that are balanced (by race) is a relatively straightforward exercise. The racial geography 
of students in 2008 meant that simply dividing the region into five roughly equal zones would 
have generated districts with roughly equivalent racial mixes. The hypothetical super districts 
range from 64,286 to 96,378 students in size and the non-white share of students range from 30 
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percent to 36 percent. The proposed districts also roughly equalize poverty across the districts 
with free and reduced price lunch eligibility ranging from 26 percent to 34 percent. (In 2008, 
actual non-white shares ranged from 3 percent to75 percent across the region’s school districts 
and free and reduced price lunch eligibility rates ranged from 5 percent to 71 percent.) 
 
The map also shows that simply creating the super districts does not solve all problems. The 
highly-segregated pattern of schools in the region means that, even with a region-wide district 
divided into five administrative zones, the distances over which students would have to travel to 
fully integrate the system are daunting. Clearly attendance zone decisions within districts could 
not do the job alone. 
 
What would a regional integration district do? 
 
A region-wide integration district—or a system of four or five districts—would not have a 
“magic bullet” policy to solve all problems. Instead, the district could engage in several 
activities, each with the potential to lessen segregation. 
 
Metro Magnets: High-quality magnets provide one avenue for metro-wide integration. The 
metro integration district could create new magnets designed to both maximize integration and 
allow districts to offer students access to different curricula than they can offer within individual 
districts in an integrated setting.  
 
School districts, even school districts in integration districts, have been continually expanding 
magnet school programs, often at great expense, to keep students in their district or attract 
students from other districts. This competition for students is costly and, ultimately, counter-
productive. Combining a regional integration district’s capabilities with new financial incentives 
for “sending” districts in the Integration Revenue formula (described in the previous section) 
could greatly enhance the opportunities available to metro students. Offering specialized magnet 
schools on a metro-wide basis would provide parents with specialized choices that could not be 
supported by a single district and allow truly forward thinking programs to emerge. 
 
The fundamental principle of WMEP admission policies provide a model for how these magnets 
could be run. Each WMEP school district contributes a proportionate number of students to the 
magnets. There have been some problems with how this has played out—some districts have not 
contributed their full allotment of students and the student groups sent to the magnets have not 
always been representative of their home districts—but the incentives that create these problems 
can be at least partially remedied with the reforms of integration revenue described above. 
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Map 7 
 
 
 
 
Coordinating District-Run Magnet Schools: School districts face conflicting incentives in 
sending students (and their attendant state funding) to inter-district magnet schools. While the 
districts are presumably happy to offer more choices to their students, losing students means lost 
funding and, potentially, public criticism for being unable to maintain home district enrollments. 
While these disincentives can be eased by reforming the integration revenue program, it will still 
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often make sense for districts, especially large districts, to operate their own magnets aimed 
primarily at their own students.  
 
Allowing districts to run their own magnet schools also makes sense for other reasons. In 
particular, a regional system that combines region-wide magnets with district-level magnets is 
the likeliest way to encourage innovation and a wide variety of magnets. However, an 
uncoordinated system could also produce needless duplication. The region-wide integration 
district would be the logical clearinghouse for approval of local proposals for new magnets. The 
regional district could also work with member districts to ensure that already-existing magnets fit 
into the regional system. 
 
Metro Job Centered Magnets: Another way to attract students from across the metro is to offer 
specialized magnet schools at large, high-density job centers, like Minneapolis’ central business 
district or parts of the I-494 corridor. Magnet schools at job centers have tremendous integrative 
potential and can be an attractive alternative for commuters. Job center magnets allow working 
parents to more easily attend parent-teacher conferences, after school events, and to pick their 
children up after work. In other metros, parents who send their children to job-center magnets are 
actually able to lunch with their children. Since parents often commute across significant 
distances, it makes sense that these job center magnets be available to students on a metro-wide 
basis and be run by a metro integration district.  Job center magnets can also maintain integrated 
student bodies by enrolling students whose parents work in the job center while guaranteeing a 
certain number of seats to students who live in a designated attendance zone that is near the job 
center.  
 
Oversight of Member District Integration: Oversight over school desegregation efforts is 
currently vested in the Minnesota Department of Education. Many school advocates have been 
critical of numerous aspects of the state desegregation rule, including the scope of the current 
rule and the efficacy of the department’s efforts. The existing integration districts could, even 
under the current desegregation rule, pressure their member districts to adopt integrative 
boundary solutions. However, the inherent conflict-of-interest between the integration district’s 
interest in integration and the board members’ allegiance to their own districts may explain why 
the collaborations generally don’t weigh in on boundary decisions. Changing the board 
leadership structure might remove some of the conflicts of interest, but the collaborations would 
still have no power to stop non-integrative boundary decisions. Unless it was given the power by 
the legislature, it could still only advise districts.  
 
Losing some power over boundary decisions could be a highly contentious issue to some 
districts. However, there could be advantages to member districts in granting some oversight of 
boundary-making decisions to a metro integration district. For instance, altering boundaries often 
involves costs for expensive outside consultants because it is not economic for individual 
districts to build this capability. At a larger scale—the metro scale—the economics could be 
different. In addition, in select cases, the power to draw boundaries that cross district lines could 
be used to alleviate crowding in one district by sharing facilities with an adjoining district, 
potentially preventing unnecessary construction of new school facilities in one district while 
capacity is underutilized (or schools are closed down) in another. 
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How would a regional integration district be organized? 
 
Because of the diversity of interests and the wide variety of responsiblities within potential 
regional (or subregional) integration districts, participation in the metro-integration district 
would have to be mandatory. If individual districts could opt out of the district or of specific 
programs, then the integration district’s viability would be threatened every time non-unanimous 
decisions were made. Inevitably, there would be specific issues where individual districts felt 
that the benefits were outweighed by costs, even when region-wide net benefits were substantial. 
 
The current boards of the inter-district collaboratives are comprised of the superintendents of 
each of the participating districts. This is widely regarded as unwieldy. The current structure 
creates conflicts of interest for the superintendents, uses too much of their time, and gives 
disproportionate power to smaller districts. Conflicts of interest are a clear problem with the 
current board structure. For instance, it is very hard to envision a superintendent approving a 
measure which penalizes a segregative boundary decision on the part of his or her home district. 
In the best scenario, board members should have a single formal affiliation—to the metro board. 
 
It makes sense that each school district be represented by a board member. However, unless the 
board is made very large, this creates a proportionality problem. A one member-one vote system 
(like the current one) gives disproportionate power to small districts. There are several ways to 
create a more stable board. An elected board could be comprised of one member from each 
district elected solely to serve on the metro board during regular school district elections. Each 
member’s vote would then be weighted by the district’s percentage of total students. While board 
members would still represent districts, they would not feel the same intensity of conflict of 
interest that the superintendents now face. Alternatively, a board could be appointed by the 
legislature, another state agency, or be appointed by the school districts. The advantage of a 
board appointed by an outside actor, such as the state, is that it would not face the same conflicts 
of interest that a school district appointed board would have. Appointed members, however, 
should not be selected existing school boards. 
 
 
VI. Policies to Reduce Segregation: Affordable Housing Programs 
 
The placement of affordable housing is a critical part of neighborhood segregation. 
Concentrating affordable housing in racially segregated or poor neighborhoods deepens 
segregation. By encouraging construction of affordable housing units in such neighborhoods, 
many government housing programs contribute to residential segregation. 
 
In 1970, the U. S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) created site and 
neighborhood standards to ensure that its housing programs complied with the requirements of 
the 1968 Fair Housing Act. These standards explicitly prohibit the construction of new 
affordable housing in racially segregated neighborhoods. Since the early 1970s, however, HUD 
has weakened the enforcement of these anti-segregation measures by establishing major 
exceptions to the standards.29 These exceptions significantly eroded the integration potential of 
existing affordable housing programs such as public housing and the Section 8.  
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Meanwhile, many new affordable housing programs that emerged in recent decades do not have 
measures to prevent segregation in neighborhoods. In fact, programs such as the Low Income 
Housing Tax Credits (LIHTC) and the Community Reinvestment Act intensify segregation by 
providing incentives to construct low-income housing in poor neighborhoods which tend to be 
racially segregated.30 HUD also carved out significant exceptions to the site and neighborhood 
standards in several of its important new programs, such as Hope VI and Housing Opportunities 
Made Equal (HOME). As a result, these programs tend to perpetuate residential segregation in 
metropolitan areas as well.31  
 
The Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Program  
 
The LIHTC program is the largest federal program that supports building low-income housing.32 
Created by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the program provides over five billion dollars a year for 
the construction, acquisition or rehabilitation of low-income housing.33 The program allows 
investors in residential rental property to claim tax credits for the development or rehabilitation 
of property to be rented to low-income tenants. While the Internal Revenue Service regulates the 
distribution of tax credits, state housing finance agencies make the decisions to fund specific 
projects and administer the allocation of tax credits. 
 
The program provides incentives to promote the construction of low-income housing in 
“qualified census tracts,” which HUD defines as tracts “in which 50 percent or more of the 
households have an income which is less than 60 percent of the area median gross income for 
such year or which has a poverty rate of at least 25 percent.”34 As a result, many state agencies, 
including Minnesota’s, have allocated significant numbers of credits to areas with high 
concentrations of minorities and people with low incomes.35  
 
While the distribution of LIHTC units in the Twin Cities metro is less concentrated in the core of 
the region than in most metropolitan areas, the location of these units appears to be pro-
integrative in only a very few places.36 Since the inception of the LIHTC program, 
approximately 5,000 LIHTC units have been located in Twin Cities suburbs and an equal 
number have been located in the central cities.37 Although this fifty-fifty split seems “fair,” it 
does not reflect the fact that Minneapolis and St. Paul represent just 23 percent of the region’s 
total population.  
 
Map 8 shows the location of LIHTC units in Minneapolis and the surrounding school districts. It 
is clear that these units are disproportionately located in Minneapolis neighborhoods, where the 
share of minority and low-income residents are already high. The map also highlights the 
concentration of LIHTC units within Minneapolis in “qualified census tracts,” demonstrating 
how the program’s incentives to locate units in these tracts contributes to residential segregation 
within Minneapolis as well. 
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Map 8 
 
The distribution of households of color who live in the LIHTC units further contributes to 
residential segregation in the metro. As Map 9 shows, this distribution is heavily skewed toward 
the central cities and stressed inner suburbs. Among the households living in LIHTC units, 
people of color have been much more likely to locate in the cities than in the suburbs. For 
instance, sixty-five percent of the black households in LIHTC units are in the central cities, 
compared to just 50 percent of the total LIHTC units in the cities. 
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Map 9 
 
 
 
The skewed distribution of households of color within LIHTC units worsens racial segregation 
not only in neighborhoods but also in schools. Map 10 shows the racial composition of the 
LIHTC unit occupants with children by unit site. The map demonstrates that majority of the 
LIHTC households of color with children are located in racially segregated central cities or in 
stressed suburbs that are in racial transition. 
 
 
 30 
Map 10 
 
 
Map 11 shows the highly segregated nature of the elementary school attendance zones in areas 
where majority of the LIHTC households of color with children reside. 
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Map 11 
 
 
 
Overall, these patterns mean that affordable housing provided under the LIHTC program 
concentrates low-income households in racially segregated or transitioning neighborhoods and 
further intensifies school segregation by creating more racially identifiable schools with very 
high poverty enrollments.  
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The Section 8 Program 
 
The distribution of low-income housing under the Section 8 program also contributes to 
residential segregation in the region. Like the LIHTC units, low-income housing units and 
vouchers provided by the Section 8 program are located disproportionately in the central cities 
and stressed inner suburbs, where the shares of minority and low-income residents are already 
high. Similarly, the distribution of households of color who have access to housing through the 
Section 8 program is also heavily skewed toward the central cities and stressed inner suburbs. 
 
The project-based Section 8 program was the primary federal low-income housing program from 
1974 to 1983. Under this program, HUD provided assistance to public housing authorities and 
private owners for 20 to 40 years after construction or substantial rehabilitation of low-income 
rental units.38 During the nine years it was in effect, the project-based Section 8 program 
produced over 750,000 new or substantially renovated subsidized housing units nationwide, an 
average of about 83,000 per year, many of which still function as low-income housing today.39 
 
Map 12 shows the size, location, and racial composition of project-based Section 8 units in the 
Twin Cities region. Project-based Section 8 units are disproportionately in the central cities and 
inner-ring suburbs. In 2004, the central cities had 4,079—55 percent—of the region’s 7,484 
project-based Section 8 units.  
 
Map 12 also shows that the distribution of residents of color in these units was skewed toward 
the central cities and inner suburbs. For instance, while 55 percent of the project-based Section 8 
units were in the central cities, 69 percent of project-based Section 8 households who were black 
were located in the central cities.  
 
The other Section 8 program—vouchers—was intentionally designed to promote housing choice 
and mobility for low-income residents. Despite this, it also contributes to segregation by 
concentrating low-income residents in racially segregated, high poverty neighborhoods. Under 
the Section 8 voucher program, the administering public housing authority (PHA) pays a 
landlord the difference between 30 percent of household income and the PHA-determined 
payment standard—about 80 to 100 percent of the fair market rent. Section 8 vouchers are 
portable; a tenant who receives a voucher in one jurisdiction can take it to another for use.40  
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Map 12 
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In 2004, there were 17,109 Section 8 vouchers used for housing in the Twin Cities. The vouchers 
contributed to residential segregation because, as Map 13 shows, they were used 
disproportionately in the central cities and stressed suburbs. The central cities contained less than 
23 percent of the region’s population but they had 47 percent of the metro’s Section 8 vouchers. 
 
Map 13 
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The program also concentrated minorities in the central cities and stressed inner suburbs because 
households of color using the vouchers were more likely to locate in these areas (Maps 13 and 
14). Fifty-eight percent of black households used their vouchers in the central cities while only 
46 percent of all the Section 8 voucher users were located in the central cities. 
 
Map 14 
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The skewed distribution of project-based Section 8 units and Section 8 vouchers not only leads 
to further concentrations of race and poverty in neighborhoods but also generates more racially 
identifiable schools with high poverty enrollments. By locating low-income residents of color 
and their children in highly segregated elementary school attendance zones, the Section 8 
program intensifies school segregation in the region. A comparison of Maps 11, 12, 13 and 14 
clearly shows the geographical overlap between the distribution of Section 8 housing and the 
location of segregated school attendance zones. 
 
As the Federal housing programs and the state housing agencies that administer these programs 
concentrate affordable housing units in the central cities and stressed inner suburbs, they skew 
the regional distribution of affordable housing, intensify the spatial mismatch of jobs and 
affordable housing in the region, and undermine the employment opportunities of people of color 
and low-income residents. Map 15 clearly illustrates the uneven geographical distribution of all 
affordable housing units in the Twin Cities region, with the highest affordability rates 
concentrated in the core. 
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Map 15 
 
 
 
Chart 6 breaks down the availability of affordable housing by various community types in the 
region. While low-opportunity communities such as the central cities and the stressed suburbs 
had roughly half of the region’s total housing stock, they had nearly three quarters of the region’s 
housing units affordable to people with 50 percent of the regional median income. In contrast, 
the moderate- and high-opportunity communities had just a quarter of the region’s affordable 
housing compared to half of the region’s total housing units. 
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Chart 6 
 
Source: Computed from 2000 Census of Population and Housing. 
 
 
In prior work, IRP estimated the potential effects on school integration of different types of 
housing policy reforms.41 For the purposes of these simulations, an integrated school was defined 
as one with a black enrollment between seven percent and 35 percent. Seven percent represents 
one-half the regional average share for black students, and 35 percent is a share often used to 
approximate the point at which continued racial transition is very likely. 
  
In 2005, 375 of the roughly 1,000 schools in the seven-county region showed black student 
shares in the seven to 35 percent range; 443 showed shares less than seven percent and 184 
schools had shares above 35 percent. If integrating all schools was achieved simply by having 
students of appropriate races in the appropriate schools trade places, then roughly 9,900 black 
students in schools above the 35 percent ceiling would have to trade places with 9,900 white 
students in schools below the seven percent floor. However, a choice program would be unlikely 
to result in one-for-one trades across schools. 
 
If, instead, only 50 percent of the black students leaving predominantly black schools were 
replaced by white students then about 12,500 black students would have to re-locate to 
predominantly white and already-integrated schools in order for all schools to be below the 35 
percent ceiling. If none of the black students leaving segregated schools were replaced by white 
students, then the number would increase to 15,250. 
 
Thus, there is no single magic number of student moves that would result in integrated schools 
across the entire region. But 12,500 represents the middle of the range, and was used as the 
starting point for evaluating the potential impact of the Low Income Housing Tax Credit 
(LIHTC) and the project-based Section 8 programs. 
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Table 2 shows the potential impact of making two integrative changes in the LIHTC and Section 
8 programs.42 If LIHTC and project-based Section 8 units were assigned randomly by race, there 
would be an additional 1,527 black students in the suburbs―738 due to the LIHTC program and 
789 due to Section 8. If, in addition, LIHTC and Section 8 units were located in proportion to 
population, there would be another 1,956 black students in the suburbs―655 due to the LIHTC 
program and 1,301 due to Section 8. These changes alone could have brought the region nearly a 
third of the way to the goal of integrated schools—3,483 (738 + 789 + 655 + 1,301) more black 
student would reside in the suburbs. 
 
The location-specific race data needed to repeat the LIHTC and Project-based Section 8 
simulations for the Section 8 voucher program is not available.43 However, at a very general 
level, if the distribution of vouchers were changed to reflect population shares, then there would 
be 4,750 more Section 8 vouchers used in the suburbs than is currently the case. At current 
average rates for the region as a whole, this would mean an additional 2,215 black households in 
the suburbs. This data suggests that there is probably as much potential for the Section 8 
vouchers to affect school desegregation efforts as for each of the other two programs shown in 
Table 2. If this is the case, then adding Section 8 vouchers to the simulations would bring the 
totals in Table 2 up to roughly 50 percent of the number of students needed to achieve the goal of 
integrated schools across the entire seven-county region. 
 
Table 2 
Metro School Integration Scenarios 
 
Number of black students who would have to change schools in order to 
achieve racial balance.  
 
  12,580 
 
 
Number of additional black students who would already be in a racially 
integrated school if: 
• LITHC units were assigned randomly by race.  
• Section 8 project units were assigned randomly by race. 
 
 
 
 
       738 
       789 
 
 
Number of additional black students that would already be in a racially 
integrated school if:  
• LIHTC units were distributed across the region in proportion 
                to school enrollment. 
• Section 8 project units were distributed across the region in 
               proportion to school enrollment.  
 
 
  
        655 
 
     1,301 
 
Additional Section 8 vouchers in the suburbs if they were distributed in same 
proportions as school enrollment. 
   
 
    4,750 
 
Source: Computed from Minnesota Department of Education data. 
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It is clear that these simulations represent fairly rough estimates. However, the fundamental 
message is equally clear. Given the actual distributions of affordable housing under these 
programs and of students in Twin Cities schools, relatively modest housing policy changes have 
the potential to make a serious dent in school segregation. Further, many of these very worthy 
programs currently have long waiting lists for participation. If they were expanded to levels 
commensurate with demand and modified to reflect the modest changes included in the 
simulations, these programs have the potential to create something very special in America—a 
stably integrated regional school system.  
 
 
VII. Conclusions 
 
The time is ripe for new approaches to integration in the Twin Cities. Past practices are largely 
failing. Students of color in Twin Cities schools are more and more likely to be isolated in non-
white segregated schools. These schools that are overwhelmingly poor—more than nine out of 
ten non-white segregated elementary schools have poverty rates above 40 percent and more than 
seven out of ten show rates above 75 percent. 
 
The current situation in schools exacerbates the performance gap between white and non-white 
students. Indeed it could be argued that economic segregation like what we now see actually 
creates the gap. Growing school segregation also accelerates neighborhood segregation, which in 
turn feeds back to further increase segregation in schools. 
 
To break the vicious cycle, we must deal with school and neighborhood integration on a regional 
scale. The Twin Cities has been well served by a rich tradition of regional policy-making in other 
policy areas. It is time to extend these efforts to schools and housing. 
 
The infrastructure for reform is in place—the integration revenue program provides a pool of 
funds to support local efforts; existing integration districts provide the framework and experience 
for a larger, improved system; and existing federal housing programs are large enough to make a 
serious dent in the problem with only modest reforms. 
 
Finally, the last piece of the puzzle--the political will to act—may also be in place. Legislators on 
both sides of the aisle in the Minnesota House and Senate have expressed support for reform to 
refocus the Integration Revenue Program. And officials in each of the Integration Districts and 
affected Superintendents have suggested that the current system needs reform. Many of the 
primary actors thus agree that the time to act is now. 
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